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		In this paper, New Public Management is interpreted as a dimension of global​isation with certain implications on democracy. The analysis uses McCourt’s classi​fication which differentiates among 3 public administration mod​els: the classic model, the Washington model and the New Public Management model. The Washington model is the most significant from the point of view of globalisation, since it is used by the IMF and the World Bank to conduct global​isation of the public sector by imposing homogenisation, i.e. “the one best way” towards the re​form of the public sector, on all countries applying for loans (devel​oping coun​tries, transition countries, etc.). According to reports drawn up by the donors themselves, the Washington model is more or less doomed to failure. There are numerous reasons for this, but it seems that the most important one lies in its lim​ited, primarily financial approach. 
		Consequently, the British model seems more interesting. This model is identi​cal to the Washington model only in its first stage, and is subsequently enhanced with a greater number of dimensions. However, this model is replete with para​doxes and has negative effects on the fundamental principles of democracy. 
		The Swedish model is briefly presented as an alternative. This model points to the possibility of opposing the dominant aspect of globalisation and hierarchically imposed homogenisation with a different aspect of globalisation through the net​working of self-organising and self-regulatory elements. 
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	The goal of this paper is to consider the concept of New Public Management as one of the dimensions of globalisation, and to view its implications on democracy. The con​sequences of the oil crisis starting from the first oil shock, leading to a tenfold increase in prices, consisted in serious budget deficits in nearly all welfare states. The eighties were bitter years of ruthless cuts in the budgets of the public sector and public pro​grammes. 
	There was a growing need to reduce expenses while simultaneously raising levels of efficiency and effectiveness. In such circumstances, there were increasing demands to apply business management principles and methods for managing the public sector.
	New Public Management is the common denominator for a number of public sector re​forms that have been implemented in the last twenty years in most OECD countries, developing countries, and transition countries. These countries are fundamentally dif​ferent in terms of their economic, socio-political, cultural, constitutional and institu​tional nature, and thus also in the way they manage public administration. 
	Even within one group of countries – the developed Western countries – there are enormous differences. However, these differences are not reflected in their reform mod​els, which might be reduced to two basic models according to their primary regulatory mechanism: the British model of privatisation and the market, and the Swedish model of management by results. There is also a third model, which is less prominent, the Dutch-Danish model with a primary regulatory mechanism comprising devolu​tion/decentralisation. In all these models, competitive instruments appear as a secondary mechanism, while, as tertiary mechanisms, management by results emerges in the case of the British model, decentralisation in the case of the Swedish model, and privatisa​tion in the Dutch-Danish model. The management regimes are derived from these mod​els: the British – the private sector and market regime; the Swedish – the regime of management by results; and the Dutch-Danish – the devolution regime. There is also a fourth regime – the traditional regime of management by rules (Weber’s model) as a primary instrument accompanied by competitive instruments in second, and privatisa​tion in third place (Naschold, 1996: 45). 
	McCourt’s classification seems particularly suitable for an analysis of the reform of the public sector as one dimension of the globalisation process. McCourt identifies three models: the classic public administration model, the Washington model (a name he chose as an echo of the Washington Consensus, an epithet constructed to describe an approach built on World Bank and IMF structural adjustment loans), and the New Pub​lic Management model (NPM). 
	For some authors, NPM is everything that Reagan and Thatcher did to the public sec​tor, or even unbelievably, “whatever the World Bank has done to the public sector”. McCourt considers such an understanding as inadequate, and defines it with elements that the OECD (1995) listed in its overview of public management development: devo​lution of competences, provision of flexibility, development of competition and choice, provision of adequate service, improvement of the quality of regulation, and strength​ening of the management functions of the central authority. Besides, McCourt also adds a fourth emerging model: strategic management (McCourt, 2001: 220-239).
	The author subjects these models to a test containing six contingencies: perform​ance, capacity, integrity, neutrality, dependence, and modelling opportunity – an exam​ple that can be followed. Performance relates to the quality of activities provided by the services, capacity relates to the capacity of administration in implementing reforms, in​tegrity is how reform influences the level of corruption, neutrality relates to the neutral​ity of public administration towards politics in terms of care for the means and not the ends, dependence relates to long-term dependence on external assistance, and modelling opportunity is the supply of concrete examples that can be applied (McCourt, 2001: 27-29).
	McCourt's classification reflects the chronological order in which the models ap​peared. The classic model appeared at the beginning of the 20th century, and the Wash​ington model was applied for the first time in 1982 in the case of Ghana, when a form was drawn up where the World Bank and the IMF encouraged the downsizing of the public sector as a condition for obtaining a loan. At the same time, reform of the public sector was initiated in Britain; this reform had the same characteristics as the Washing​ton model, although, in the case of Britain, the application of the model was not a con​dition or stimulus set by international institutions, but the political will of the Prime Minister, whose frame of mind was identical to the mindset of these financial institu​tions.​[1]​ Gradually, the reform in Great Britain was extended to include new elements, and so the name New Public Management should be used for the later stages of British reform, where Naschold’s classification recalls the primary management instrument in the British reform model. 
	The Washington reform model was prompted by the cutting of public sector costs, i.e. public spending. It required the privatisation of public companies, or at least a de​crease in financial support to these companies. Within the core of the public sector – in public administration – there were increasing demands to reduce salaries by introducing early retirement and by applying pressure on people to retire; salary decompression was offered to senior civil servants as a consolation prize. The Washington model, which is identical to the first stage of the NPM model, continues to be imposed on countries that are dependent on loans, while the World Bank and the IMF are suspicious about the later stages of the NPM model. This model’s performance shows efficiency in the pub​lic sector, but this efficiency is the consequence of financial cuts, and not of better man​agement. The application of the Washington model is not a problem, since it does not require any sophisticated instruments (except for the possibility of falling into the IT trap – computerisation of salaries); and there is also broad documentation to enable study prior to potential application.
	It is clear that, in relation to the globalisation trend, only the Washington model and the British model are significant, because the first is recommended, or rather imposed, by strong financial institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) acting as donors to coun​tries who depend upon these donations, or to countries seeking loans, either as devel​oping, or transition countries, while the British model is recommended by the OECD which lists it as the best example of reform of the public sector. 
	The reason for this is that these models largely incorporate the neo-liberal idea, whose apotheosis we have been witnessing in the last two decades, as well as the trans​lation of neo-liberal principles into an entire spectrum of reforms involving the public sector. 
	Along with economic reforms focused on freeing the market of interventions by the state, the reform of the public sector follows the same logic of blurring the difference between the “public” and “private”, by decreasing the size and activity of the state while introducing the principle of private into the public sector. “This application of the de​manding concept of political economy caused even more damage to the idea that the public sector comprises a small and specific set of individual institutions. Reviewing management or the public sector meant reviewing the state in the context of its broad relationships towards society and the economy, and, by obeying this logic, neo-liberal principles were applied equally to the area of social policy and economic policy” (Mingue/Polidano/Hulme, 1998: 2).
	The perspective of NPM is being formed through neo-liberal economic principles, subjecting the size, role and structure of the public sector to critical examination. This is not limited to the developed world. The public sector is said to have failed as the driving force of national development; in some countries it has even become a barrier to this development. It is particularly stressed that public administration is incapable of effi​ciently managing activities such as the electric power industry or communications. The private sector has been increasingly emphasised as one comprising managerial capacity, flexibility and a competitive drive, which are important for efficiently performing many activities that were earlier believed to belong to the public sector. 
	The promotion of the Washington, or the British, model​[2]​ of public sector reform by the OECD was prompted “it seems, by a global ideological consensus” (Minogue, 2001: 3). Since this applies to the globalisation of the basically western model of political economy, its application causes very complex problems that remain uninvestigated.
	It seems that for M. Thatcher, ideological reasons came before economic ones – the re​form itself, led by the idea of assessing every activity on the basis of previously de​termined standards (indicators), did not have any established criteria for evaluation. 
	At the same time, reform model of the British public sector contains a number of para​doxes. According to V. Wright, the most radical reforms aimed at achieving greater efficiency are implemented in a country which already has the most efficient admini​stration – thus, where this is least necessary; “reform are inspired by theories or models of private management which are notoriously fickle indeed; they have the life span of the average heroine in a Puccini opera. Moreover, the record of private management in the country with the greatest propensity to emulate the private sector, the United King​dom, is, to say the least, checquered” (Wright, 1997: 9). A further paradox relates to the “role of the top bureaucrats as one of the principal motors of reform. In much of the neo-liberal neo-liberal and public choice literature, which has provided so much intel​lectual ammunition for the political reformers, those bureaucrats are depicted as intrin​sically inefficient, driving their job satisfaction from politicking, status, guaranteed pen​sions, and content to apply the rules. And, of course, they are intent on budget maximi​sation or bureau expansion. Or, according to another public choice school, they are em​bedded in the great “distributional coalitions”, those cosy and collusive networks, guilty of expanding the state. Historically, this was always a caricature, even though there was some anecdotal empirical evidence in some countries to provide a semblance of truth to the portrayal. There is also considerable historical evidence that these bureaucrats were often source of effective reform initiatives” (Wright, 1997: 10). More precisely, new in​formation shows that the top bureaucrats are not at all allergic to reform programmes which have the most acute effect on the lower layers of bureaucracy, while at the top these programmes offer exciting opportunities for policy-oriented managerialism. 
	The fourth paradox lies in the fact that while the purpose of reform is to cut costs, the end result may be just the opposite. Thus, the “evaluation” that everyone is so ex​cited about tends to ignore the costs of the human resources involved in performing it. Evaluation can reveal the areas of loss and irrational spending, but can also reveal the until-then hidden differences in performance and outcomes, which can cause political pressure to eliminate these differences and thus require additional funds. The same ef​fect will be achieved through the transformation of the citizen into a consumer who ex​pects a better quality of services and a better use of procedures (mostly legal ones) through which he/she will try to exercise the right to quality service. Clarity and trans​parency, which are the desirable aims of every democracy, also have their own hidden costs. The greatest part of all public policies consists in rationalisation in terms of the distribution of scarce resources. It is very difficult to enforce this policy during long pe​riods of stagnation or recession. However, it is still well enforced through a combination of ignorance, acceptance and legitimisation. Significant delegitimisation in the new re​form is implemented through the transfer of decision-making from politicians and self-regulated professionals (for instance, teachers and doctors) to managers and entrepre​neurs “who quite simply lack the essential legitimacy to spread essential misery. We may expect, therefore, increased controversies and resort to the courts for redress, thus accentuating the trend towards litigation” (Wright, 1997: 11).
	Transparency and clarity of work are another paradox. The demand for clearer manage​rial aims, and, related to this, the increased autonomy of managers, blurs the is​sue of political accountability. The penultimate paradox concerns efficiency, the “Holy Grail” of administrative reformers. The purpose is to raise the awareness of public ser​vants at all levels of the idea of efficiency, regardless of how undefined this term is. “Efficiency in the provision of public services involves complex political and social externalities”. If citizens are turning into consumers, public servants will gradually turn into producers motivated by the private-market logic of rewards.
	The final paradox lies in the reformers’ ambition to reduce the role of the state. How​ever, radical reform programmes aimed at withdrawing the state from a number of sectors require a strong state to initiate and implement these programmes. Secondly, some reforms imply increased activity by the state (for instance, in the area of education and health care, bodies that were once mainly self-governed have been attacked from all sides by evaluation, performance indicators and targets, as well as by other parapherna​lia of an interventionist state). 
	In brief, the process of modernisation has produced paradoxes that confirm the old saying concerning public policies that today’s solutions are tomorrow’s problems. These paradoxes may be temporary and specific for a particular country, and might be more apparent than real. On the other hand, they could be interpreted as a slipping of the reform policy with unforeseeable consequences, although most of these consequences can be predicted (Wright, 1997: 12). 
	The analysis of results and consequences has been only partially conducted, and by outside analysts. Positive results have not been achieved in terms of productivity and unemployment on the macroeconomic plane, the costs of the public sector have grown and the number of people employed has fallen; the number of public bodies has in​creased through the separation of agencies from ministries on the one hand, and by the formation of so-called quangos on the other hand, where the quality of certain services has dropped significantly. Through the privatisation of public property, a radical redis​tribution of resources has been made to benefit the minority, to the detriment of the majority. Thus, in the period of 1979-92, the absolute poverty line rose from 9% of the population to 25%. At the same time, 10% of the poorest people pay a total of 43% of taxes (direct and indirect), while the 10% of the richest people pay 32% (Mishra, 1999: 31). In addition, ac​tivities which should have been managed according to the criterion of the general good were managed according to the profit criterion, which led to the af​firma​tion of neo-Taylorism in managing privatised companies: companies with a higher level of productivity were privatised, and the public sector was left with weaker compa​nies. In this way, the oil industry was privatised first (1982), while coal mines (1994) and rail​ways (1994-95) were last. In the period of 1979-91 in the UK, privatisation pro​ceeds as 11.9% of average annual GDP. It was higher only in New Zealand, at 14% in the pe​riod of 1987-91, while in the same period in Holland it was 1%, in Italy 1.4%, and in France 1.5% for the period of 1983-91. On the other hand, the share of public spend​ing in GDP did not decrease – the mean value of 43.7% marks the period of 1970-79 (La​bour party in power) and 43.8% for the period when M. Thatcher was in power. Simi​larly, eco​nomic growth did not show any great difference between the periods be​fore and after the reform, that is, after the arrival of M. Thatcher: 2.2% in 1970-79,and the same in 1980-89. “In selecting the privatisation organisation, priority was given to op​portunities for a fast inflow of cash, which reduces state borrowing”, a process de​scribed by the earlier Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, as similar to the “selling off of the family silver”. While the UK was the flagship for privatisation, the benefits to the economy and society of the UK were not self-evident. Literature dealing with privatisa​tion and market mechanisms does not offer firm proof of increased efficiency. The only reliable data show a decrease in the number of people employed in the public sector (Minogue, 2001: 21-37).
	At the same time, the fundamental values of democracy were put at risk: responsibil​ity and accountability (related to organisations), justice and equality, and an increasing number of appointments rather than elections, and, related to this, patronage and cor​ruption, as well as visibly weakened local self-government. 
	In spite of all this, this very model that glorifies privatisation was pronounced “the one best way”. The democratic principles of transparency and responsibility, which are valid for the client states of the IMF and the World Bank, should also be valid for the IMF and the World Bank themselves. Therefore, the question remains about who these institutions are accountable to, and in whose name they impose the management reform model (Harlow, 2001: 33). 
	Taking into account all the open issues and unresolved complex problems of this re​form model, it is not surprising that the countries receiving loans have begun asking their donors more and more embarrassing questions, and have been increasingly op​posing this reform model, while being aware at the same time that reform is necessary to increase competitive capacities in conditions of globalisation. 
	Recent reports from the World Bank and the IMF have, on the one hand, shown suc​cessful examples of their model, but also examples of a number of countries where this model has failed. In the 1997 World Development Report, (World Bank, 1997) concern was expressed about the influence that the model could have on service provision and the development of the human factor: a footnote in the special report speaks of the worsened relationship between teachers and pupils in African schools, while another re​port distanced itself from the strange insistence of Kenya to increase the number of teachers (probably to improve the relationship between teachers and students), and from exaggerated spending for the distribution of milk in primary schools (World Bank, 1994: 128).
	On the other hand, faced with the strength of opposition, they are beginning to recog​nise the crucial role that the state has in developing countries in efficiently re​sponding to the social and economic needs of their population; in other words, in man​agement of development. In this case, the state should remain responsible for formulat​ing and implementing policies, particularly in relation to economic transformation, the decrease of poverty, improvements in agricultural production, employment opportuni​ties, better social service and environmental protection.
	Although there is strong pressure towards global homogeneity through the reform of the public sector, it is questionable whether any country of a pluralist democracy would apply the Washington model if there had been no support and pressure by donors. This model was most successfully applied (according to the assessment of the IMF and the World Bank) in Chile, Ghana and Uganda, whose governments gained power through a coup. In other words, the model functions best in authoritarian regimes that depend on assistance from Washington. Among countries which refused to accept the Washington model are Malaysia and South Africa, while Sri Lanka abandoned the programme after an initial period. These countries showed they were capable of going their own way to​wards reform of the public sector, taking elements from various models at different stages of the implementation of the reform. Therefore, it could be said that a domestic (own) model was developed that suited the needs of each particular country. In this way, Malaysia and Sri Lanka increased the salaries of civil servants before, and even after, the great East Asian economic crash. 
	It is difficult to expect that differences among administrative systems, which have deep roots in the political culture of individual states, will simply disappear. It is not feasible that global uniformity will flourish, since there is a need to maintain identity and character in a world that seems to want to press everyone into a mould of compla​cent and uniform consumerism. The World Bank and the IMF will have to think about where their exclusive concern about money which excludes management is leading them, as well as their unwillingness to become involved in any considerations that do not have a financial dimension. Consequently, even when they succeed in changing government policy, the government often refuses to accept “ownership” of such policy. 
	Countries that wish to oppose globalisation through the homogenisation of the pub​lic sector should certainly gain a deeper insight into the alternative public service reform model – the Swedish model. 
	Globalisation is not just an economic phenomenon propelled by the market. It is at the same time a political and ideological phenomenon. The supranational management of economic and social policies of individual countries through international state or​ganisations has to be treated in a broad neo-liberal direction, as central to the process of globalisation. In a situation where there is no world government, the ideological prefer​ences of the strongest world power are registered in transnational policies. For Albert, the neo-liberal version of capitalism gains power over other versions (for example, the German or Japanese version, mostly for cultural and ideological reasons. This is the “seductive power” of the American model, which explains its growing popularity (Al​bert, 1991: 169).
	Financial globalisation, i.e. the free movement of money and capital across state bor​ders, and the loss of strict control over the movement of capital, has changed the context in which the welfare state used to operate. Albert believes that “financial glob​alisation is the main vehicle through which the ultraliberal model spread across the world. Its power is such that not even the best organised economies – the Rhine econo​mies – can efficiently oppose it” (Albert, 1991: 190).
	Financial globalisation is the greatest obstacle to the functioning of a welfare state. It limits freedom of choice of policies – particularly social ones. However, it seems that the Swedish model managed to overcome the greatest crisis in 1990-91 when the social democrats lost power, and that it has been stabilised once again. Part of the credit for this certainly belongs to the reform of the public sector, as implemented by the social-democratic government. From the viewpoint of distributional justice, this model is neu​tral, that is, it has not produced any effects on the high level of equality in place in Swedish society. In the same way, unemployment at the beginning of 2003 affected only 4.7% of the working population. The decrease in public spending was facilitated by increased efficiency achieved through the primary orientation towards management by results. This is a trajectory at the level of concrete organisations, i.e. at a micro level, which eventually also produces effects on the macro level. What is basically a short-term orientation of management by results is transcended through strategic planning and strategic management in a decentralised context of amalgamated municipalities. 
	The deregulation of capital flows frees capital from responsibility towards the na​tional state, at the same time increasing external pressure on states and simultaneously liberating them from internal democratic pressure. The issue of social protection can only be in the hands of a national or supranational state, such as the one the European Union could become. Since most Member States of the European Union still implement social protection policies (neo-liberals call this “eurosclerosis”), it is probable that this policy will be transferred to the level of the Union, within whose enlarged borders ex​ternal pressure will lessen, and internal freedom of choice of policy will grow. This higher level of integration will also require a higher level of democratisation of the deci​sion-making process at the EU level. These processes have been initiated, but are still far from satisfactory. 
	The logic of globalisation conflicts with the logic of national community and democ​ratic policy. It causes a systematic redistribution of income from the bottom up (to the richest). In such circumstances, it is impossible to implement a policy that is more left than centre (the best example is mandatory regressive tax rates, while the pol​icy of progressive tax rates is not accepted). The logic of globalisation, unlike the logic of democracy, can be seen in the fact that the majority of the public disagree with the neo-liberal model in countries that have made the most progress in this direction. This public wants as much social security as possible, better health and pension insurance, and higher benefits in the case of unemployment. The vast majority would agree to higher taxes if they knew what they were getting for them, or, in other words, if the situation was more transparent (Mishra, 1999: 58).
	The East Asian economic crash in 1998 showed that the consequences of deregu​lated financial capital could be global, which would once more raise the issue of the need to reintroduce regulation. This would be an opportunity for the full revitalisation of the welfare state within national borders. In any case, the chance remains in regional, supranational frames such as the EU, where a unified exchange between the principles of equality and efficiency will be possible in all cases. There is no reason to assume that states would acquire similar structures to resolve even the similar economic or social problems they face. The self-organisation and self-monitoring of systems that are con​nected in both regional and global networks, as opposed to hierarchically imposed ho​mogeneous structures, appear as a feasible and, certainly, more desirable aspect of glob​alisation and, consequently, a better opportunity for democracy.
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^1	  The same is true of Reagan’s model: The President's Private Sector and Service Cost Control (PPSSCC). Reagan handed over the reform of federal administration to private sector managers. The reform was a total failure. 
^2	  The British model is in fact Chilean – The Chicago Boys, i.e. Milton Friedman’s students returned to Chile in the seventies and began implementing reforms. M. Thatcher carefully observed this experiment and adopted the instruments for reforms in Great Britain. 
